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EFFECT OF DISCOUNT OR PREMIUM ON BONDHOLDER'S NORTH CAROLINA INCOME TAX
HENRY BRANrns, JR.*
I. BONDS NOT ISSUED By GOVERNMENTAL UNITS

A. Acquired at a Discount
If a taxpayer, reporting income upon an accrual basis, becomes an
original subscriber for a $1,000 ten-year corporate bond, paying therefor $950, or if, ten years prior to maturity, he purchases for $950 an
outstanding $1,000 bond, does the discount so received represent, for
North Carolina income tax purposes: (1) Taxable income in the year
of subscription or purchase? (2) Taxable income to be spread over
the period of his ownership, one-tenth of the discount being treated as
income each year? (3) Taxable income, to the extent realized, upon
sale or redemption?
There are no authoritative state judicial decisions or administrative
regulations indicating which of these alternatives the taxpayer is to
follow. If precedent is to be sought, therefore, it must be sought in
the Federal cases and administrative rulings.
In its broadest significance discount might be said to include any
amount by which acquisition price is less than the face value of an
obligation. However, it does not result from the same factors in every
case; and, for Federal tax purposes, it has not received the same treatment in every case. To what extent the differences in the Federal treatment are based upon differences in the factors responsible for the discount, and to what extent they are based on other more or less justifiable
considerations, is a question which must be examined with some degree
of care. At the outset it may be conceded that present Federal practices involve, on the surface at least, a welter of theoretical inconsistencies; that both administrators and judges have contributed to this
state of affairs; and that neither the administrators nor the Board of
Tax Appeals nor the Federal courts have'ever undertaken a complete
analysis of all these inconsistent practices in an attempt to show if or
how they can be justified in relation to each other.
Conversely, it must be admitted that practical administrative considerations may be entitled to great weight even though they may lead
to theoretical inconsistencies; and that both the taxpayer's convenience
and state administrative efficiency are served when the state and Federal
tax authorities follow the same rules. To some extent, therefore, the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
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problem for the state is whether administrative factors and the advantages of uniformity will justify its acceptance of the Federal inconsistencies.
One type of discount is commonly described as a commission. As
compensation for negotiating a loan or servicing it or for other alleged
services dtily rendered, a commission is deducted from the face amount
of the loan before paying the money over to the borrower. This
seems to be the primary type of discount which Federal practice recognizes as income, in its entirety, at the time the loan is made.' Originally, it was insisted that this was income at that time even when the
recipient of the commission was on a cash basis, 2 but the Board of
Tax Appeals and the courts thought otherwises and eventually the
doctrine was admitted to apply only to taxpayers on the accrual basis. 4
There seems no necessity to quarrel with the general principle thus
adopted. There is a surface inconsistency between it and the fact
that, when a corporation issues bonds, selling commission may be amortized by it over the life of the bonds.5 However, it can be argued, by
way of explanation, that the commission is, to the issuing corporation,
a cost of procuring capital which is properly amortized, while to the
recipient in the business of negotiating loans or selling bonds it is
ordinary income.
On the other hand, if a bank loans money on a non-interest bearing
note, paying over to the borrower the face amount less some agreed
sum approximating normal interest to maturity, it seems never to have
been doubted that this discount is to be treated as interest for tax
purposes. At one time, apparently, many banks entered it on their
books as interest income when the loan was made and so reported it
' Columbia State Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 41 F. (2d) 923 (C. C. A.
7th, 1930); North-Western Trust & Savings Bank, 20 B. T. A. 365 (1930);
The Bonded Mortgage Co. of Baltimore, 27 B. T. A. 965 (1933), rev'd on

another point 70 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Columbia State Savings
Bank, 31 B. T. A. 685 (1934); S. M. 3820, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 32 (1925); G. C.
M. 222, V-2 Cum. Bull. 110 (1926). The same result follows when the com-

mission, instead of being handled by a discount or deduction, is represented by a

separate note given by the borrower. American National Co. v. United States, 274
U. S. 99, 47 Sup. Ct. 520, 71 L. ed. 946 (1927). For a contrary result on particular facts, see Southern Abstract & Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d)

130 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
S. M. 3820, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 32 (1925).
s Blair v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 39 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930),
cert. denied 282 U. S. 851, 51 Sup. Ct. 29, 75 L. ed. 754 (1930) ; Helvering v.

Martin-Stubblefield, Inc., 71 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Commissioner v.
Central Republic Trust Co., 75 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) ; Chicago City
Bank & Trust Co., 24 B. T. A. 892 (1931); Cosmopolitan Bond & Mortgage
Co., 30 B. T. A. 717 (1934). All of these cases held that commissions are
income on the cash basis dnly when actually collected.
'G. C. M. 14839, XIV-1 Cum. Bull. 73 (1935).
5
Helvering v. Union Pacific Ry., 293 U. S. 282, 55 Sup. Ct. 165, 79 L. ed.

363 (1934).
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for taxation. However, it has since been held repeatedly that this is
improper whether the taxpayer is on a cash or an accrual basis. Taxpayers on the accrual basis should report such discount as earned (i.e.,
if a 90-day note is discounted 30 days before the end of the taxable
year, one-third of the discount is to be reported for that year) ;6 while
taxpayers on a cash basis are to report such discount only when the
note is paid or sold.'
The decided cases involve primarily banks and loan companies,
but the same principles should apply to other, more casual lenders
who operate on a discount basis. One difficulty, of course, is to distinguish between discount which represents interest and discount which
represents commission. The one is payment for the use of money
and the other is payment for services rendered, but such clear verbal
distinctions are often inadequate guides in practical situations. A commission can be nothing more than a device for evading the usury laws.
However, the Federal tendency seems to have been to avoid the necessity for determining whether this is the case by accepting the lender's
theory of the transaction.8 Some judges have recognized that commissions may be nothing more than additional interest and might logically be amortized, but this has not induced them to depart from a distinction already established in practice. 9
One of the administrative rulings intimates that discount is to be
regarded as interest by the original lender only if the obligation is
non-interest bearing, and expressly states that if the taxpayer acquires
the obligation by purchase the discount can be regarded as interest
only if the obligation is non-interest bearing.' 0 This was not intended
'Chatham & Phenix National Bank, 1 B. T. A. 460 (1925) ; Bank of Hartsville, 1 B. T. A. 920 (1925); Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 1 B. T. A. 922
(1925); Western Exchange Bank, 12 B. T. A. 66 (1928); S. M. 3820, IV-2
Cum. Bull. 32 (1925).
'Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935),
cert. denied 296 U. S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 99, 80 L. ed. 415 (1935) ; Chemung Canal
Trust Co., 30 B. T. A. 230 (1934), aff'd without opinion 74 F. (2d) 1009 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied 295 U. S. 751, 55 Sup. Ct. 829, 79 L. ed. 1695
(1935) ; First National Bank of Stoughton, Wis., 2 B. T. A. 586 (1925) ; First
National Bank of Sonora, Tex., 6 B. T. A. 555 (1927). When partial payments
are made the taxpayer* on a cash basis is to report a proportionate amount of
each payment as income attributable to the discount. I. T. 2526, IX-1 Cum. Bull.
123 (1930). The same rule was invoked in Shafpa Realty Corporation, 8
B. T. A. 283 (1927), though it does not appear positively whether the taxpayer
was on the cash basis.
- S. M. 3820, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 32 (1925).
'The Bonded Mortgage Co. of Baltimore v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 341
(C. C. A. 4th, 1934). For recognition of the fact that, from the standpoint of
the borrower, commissions may affect the actual interest rate, see Helvering
v. Union Pacific Ry., 293 U. S. 282, 55 Sup. Ct. 165, 79 L. ed. 363 (1934). Contrast the language employed in this case, with reference to discount and commissions, with that referring to premiums in Old Colony Ry. v. Commissioner,
284 U. S. 552, 52 Sup. Ct. 211, 76 L. ed. 484 (1932).
10S.

M. 3820, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 32 (1925).
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to mean that such discount would be treated as commission. It indicated that discount in such cases is neither interest nor commission,
but can be considered for tax purposes only in determining whether
there is gain or loss upon redemption or disposition of the obligation.
Subsequent decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals are in accord with
this in so far as it indicates that the purchaser, as distinguished from
the original lender, can treat the discount as interest if the loan is noninterest bearing; but they seem to render somewhat doubtful the conclusion that discount cannot be treated as interest if the loan is interest
bearing.11
Turning to bonds we find that, while there is no clear-cut line to be
drawn between them and the other obligations mentioned, an entirely
different approach has been followed.
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Edwards,'2 arising under
the 1913 Federal law, the Supreme Court held that premium paid for
bonds could not be amortized by the purchaser over the life of the
bonds, but could only be considered in determining gain or loss upon
disposition of the bonds. This case has since been construed as authority
for the Federal rule that neither premium nor discount on bonds is to be
amortized by the purchaser.
An exposition of the theory is contained in the following language
of the Board of Tax Appeals: "The petitioner undertakes to distinguish
the decision of the court in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, supra, from
11In Chicago Acceptance Co., 12 B. T. A. 150 (1928), "brokerage" or discount on notes, apparently non-interest bearing, purchased by a finance company
from a truck dealer was held to be accruable as earned. In Vancoh Realty Co.,
33 B. T. A. 918 (1936), the same rule was applied to discount on existing mortgage loans purchased through brokers. Apparently the loans were non-interest
bearing, though the point is none too clear and, if so, the opinion seems to attach
no particular importance to it. The language of the opinions (see the quotation
in note 14, infra) would seem to apply with equal force, once the discount is
determined not to be a commission, whether the loans also bear stated interest
or not; though, conceivably, whether or not the loans are interest bearing might
be of some importance in determining, in a disputed case, whether the discount
represents commission.
In Bank of Rockingham, 3 B. T. A. 1137 (1926) the facts show positively that
the notes were interest bearing. The taxpayer was on the cash basis, and so
the discount was not income until collected; but there is no indication whatever
in the case that this factor destroyed the character of the discount as interest
and converted it into increase in capital. In fact, the implication is to the contrary, because the case was decided on the authority of earlier bank discount
cases where non-interest bearing notes were involved.
If we are to assume that there is a difference between interest bearing and
non-interest bearing notes, it should be noted that this is not quite the same
principle as is invoked in the public security cases, subsequently discussed. There
the governing factor is whether there is an issuing discount, whereas, in the
present situation, a taxpayer purchasing a non-interest bearing note at a discount could treat the discount as interest even though the original lender received no discount; and, conversely, the purchaser of an interest bearing note
could not treat discount as interest even if the original lender did receive a discount.
" 271 U. S. 109, 46 Sup. Ct. 436, 70 L. ed. 850 (1926).
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this proceeding upon the grounds that returns of income under the
Revenue Act of 1913, which was involved in the case cited, were required to be made on the basis of cash received and disbursed, whereas
the petitioner's return for the year 1921 was made on the accrual basis.
We think, however, that no accrual can be predicated upon the premium
or discount at which a bond is purchased before a bond is sold or
redeemed. Before sale or redemption of a bond nothing occurs to fix
the amount which the holder thereof will actually realize from it
(eliminating from consideration the matter of interest which is not in
dispute here). The discount on the bond purchased below par is unlike interest, which is a fixed charge and accruing periodically. The
right to receive this discount, or difference between the cost of the bond
and its par, cannot be determined in advance as the bond may be sold
for more or less than its cost, or, as in the case of many bonds, it may
be redeemed prior to its maturity at an amount different from its principal or face amount of the bond. This discount is not earned or
accrued in annual installments and cannot be income to the holder of
the bond, either as additional interest or as a separate item of income.
If anything, the annual amortization of this discount represents merely a
theoretical appreciation in value unrealized by a sale or other disposition of the bond. It does not even represent actual appreciation as the
current market price for the bond may be above or below the cost
thereof as adjusted for previous amortization of the discount.
"The amount by which the petitioner has annually written up its
bonds and correspondingly increased income on account of the amortization of discount thereon cannot represent income received or accrued
to the petitioner under the definition of income as laid down by the
courts in many cases. The converse is true in respect to the amortization of premium on bonds bought above par. The interest received
from such bonds is not, in fact, diminished by annual charges made for
the purpose of amortizing the premium. The fact that the petitioner
may consider a part of this interest as set aside annually for the purpose of amortizing the premium does not diminish the actual interest
received or accrued on the bonds. Nor does the setting aside of the
annual amount for this ,purpose constitute a realized loss on the bonds
as the Court has pointed out in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards,supra."'
There are a number of weaknesses in this position. (1) Its result
is contrary to the best accounting practices of taxpayers holding bonds
in large amounts. (2) Subsequent language of the Board, referring
to discount on mortgage loans, is in direct conflict with it.14 (3) In
" Corn Exchange Bank, 6 B. T. A. 158, 161 (1927).
"See Vancoh Realty Co., 33 B. T. A. 918 (1936), in which it is said (at
page 923): "Such discount, like interest, is earned with lapse of time.

The
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so far as it applies to issuing discount, it is inconsistent with the fact

that the issuing corporation is required to amortize such discount.1'
(4) In so far as it apparently recognizes a fundamental difference between discount and interest it is, as will subsequently be seen, in conflict with the treatment accorded issuing discount on tax-exempt securi-

ties.
The origin of the difference in approach to discount on bonds and
discount on other obligations is none too obvious. Very probably it
grew out of the fact that in the early bank discount cases the notes were
non-interest bearing to maturity, and the conclusion that the discount
represented interest was virtually inescapable; whereas in the bond
cases the discount is almost invariably in addition to a stated interest
rate.' 6 Perhaps a contributing factor was an idea that discount could
be more readily treated as interest in connection with short-term
than with long-term securities; though no attempt has been made to
draw a line between the two and, in view of the mortgage loan cases,
17
it is unlikely that one could be drawn for this purpose.

Perhaps

amount paid upon the purchase of a mortgage loan represents as a practical
matter the present value of an obligation to pay in the future, which, in part,
is based upon the extent of the unexpired term of the mortgage note, the financial
responsibility of the obligor, the adequacy of the security, and the supply thereof
and demand therefor. The undisputed proof shows that competition and the risksof the business were factors which affected the amount of the discount. . . .As
the maturity of the obligation draws nearer, the value ordinarily increases. As
the value increases with the lapse of time and the approach of the maturity
date, the discount is being earned. Hence, when books are kept on an accrual
basis, the discount should be accrued as thus earned, whether paid or not."
While this may not quite amount to saying that the discount is interest, its
conclusion that the discount is accruable as earned is directly contrary to that
reached in the Corn Exchange Bank case, quoted in the text.
"-Helvering v. Union Pacific Ry., 293 U. S. 282, 55 Sup. Ct. 165, 79 L. ed.
363 (1934) ; Lincoln Mortgage & Title Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F. (2d)
585 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935), cert. denied 296 U. S. 654, 56 Sup. Ct. 381, 80 L. ed.
466 (1936) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §19.22(a)-18.
The present Regulations merely provide for amortization; they do not undertake to define the nature of the discount. The Federal cases have not made too
clear either the nature of the discount as it affects the issuing corporation or
the exact provision of the statute which permits it to be deducted. It has been
referred to as expense. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d)
456 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). It has been held to be, in reality, additional interest,
a proportionate part of which accrues annually. Western Md. R. R. v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). And it has been treated as loss
sustained (though the Court recognized its relation to interest). Helvering v.
Union Pacific Ry., supra. Cf. the Circuit Court of Appeals version of this
case, 69 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
26 See S. M. 3820, IV-2 Cum. Bull. 32 (1925).
Cf. 1. T. 1684, 1I-1 Cur.
Bull. 60 (1923). A bank savings plan took the form of a so-called investment
bond, the depositor having a constantly increasing redemption value which would
finally equal twice the original deposit. It was ruled that depositors on the
accrual basis should accrue each year the excess of the redemption value at
the year end over the redemption value at the beginning of the year.
" See United States v. Collier, 104 F. (2d) 420, 422 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), in
which the court said: "Where the transaction is a short term loan, and not the
sale of a security on the market, the discount deducted is interest." However, no
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there was a realization that bonds, particularly those listed on exchanges, are traded in more frequently, and that this would render
more difficult the task of determining for each case the precise part
of discount which can truly be said to represent interest (a matter
subsequently discussed in greater detail). However, the main reason
for the difference in approach must be the fact that the bonds are interest bearing. As already indicated, the Board of Tax Appeals has
cast considerable doubt upon the validity of a distinction in the treatment of discount in the note cases predicated upon this. It is obviously an entirely arbitrary distinction. Is there any essential difference
between (1) a $1,000, one-year loan at par with 2% interest, (2) a
$1,000, one-year loan with a discount of $10 and 1% interest, and (3)
a $1,000, one-year loan with a discount of $20 and no interest?
Strangely enough, under the distinction suggested, situations (1) and
(3) receive identical treatment, while the intermediate situation alone
drags in the capital increase notion. If this is the distinction, it is
dearly unsound, whether it applies both in bond and note cases or
whether, as may be possible, it operates only to draw a line between
bonds and other obligations.
The language in the bond cases and the note cases is clearly not to
be reconciled on the sole basis of the fact that in the one case the
security is interest bearing and in the other-it is not. When it is said
that the right to receive discount cannot be determined in advance
because the bond may be sold for more or less than cost, or that
discount is unlike interest because it is not a fixed charge accruing
periodically, or that amortization of discount does not necessarily reflect
changes in market value, these statements would obviously be equally
true in the case of non-interest bearing obligations. On the other hand,
when it is said that discount on a non-interest bearing note is, like interest, earned with lapse of time, and that as the maturity date draws
nearer the value of the note ordinarily increases, these statements are
equally true in the case of interest bearing obligations.
The Federal practices could not suffer unduly if they were subjected to a mild dose of re-examination and clarification. Had no
Federal rules been developed, the state would hardly arrive independently at the same results. However, are these results so objectionable that the state, at the cost of creating one more situation where
Federal and state rules are confusingly different, should refuse to accept them? Looking solely at bonds, and assuming that they constiattempt is made in the opinion to implement this distinction with definitions. Further, the things distinguished are not necessarily inconsistent. A short-term loan
may be a security and may be sold in the market, while a long-term loan may be
privately negotiated.
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tute a clearly defined class of securities, there are some factors which
weigh in favor of the Federal practice.
It is now well settled that discount on bonds is td be considered,
at some time and in some way, in computing income for tax purposes.
The questions under discussion are only as to: (a) the particular year
or years in which the discount is to 'be considered; and (b) whether,
when considered, it is to be treated as interest or as realized capital
increase.
If the taxpayer were allowed to amortize the discount, the primary
reason would be that it constitutes interest. Such a theory is more
difficult to apply to discount secured on purchase of bonds in the market
than to issuing discount.
There are at least three general types of situations. (1) The bonds
were issued at a discount and the market price, at the time of the taxpayer's purchase, is less than par only because of this and differs
from issuing price only in proportion to the remaining life of the
security-i.e., a ten-year, $1,000 bond issued at $950 is purchased by
the taxpayer after five years for $975. (2) Market price varies from
issuing price, whether the latter was par or less, because since the
issuing date interest rates on comparable securities have gone up or
down-i.e., the bond mentioned above is purchased after five years
for $960 because such rates have gone up. (3) The market price
varies from issuing price, whether the latter was par or less, because
of other factors, chief of which would be collapse of the debtor's
financial responsibility-i.e., a ten-year, $1,000 bond issued at par
or at $950 is purchased after five years at $500.
Unless the entire discount in each case, regardless of size, be considered as amortizable, the task of determining just what part of it
could be amortized might involve a tremendous amount of work.
Perhaps it could be argued that all the factors which enter into the
fixing of the market price also enter into the original fixing of the
issuing price and interest rate and that, therefore, the purchaser should
be entitled to regard any discount as amortizable interest. Obviously,
however, the parallel is weak, because, where legitimate transactions
are concerned, original issues of $1,000 bonds priced at $500 are not
so common as to make investors think of them as transactions which
serve to fix an effective interest rate. The market purchaser of a
low-price bond clearly regards the profit he hopes to reap largely
as a speculative increase in capital value and not as interest in the ordinary sense. Further, even if amortization of all discount were allowed,
trouble would immediately be caused in the low-price situations by the
general rule that any accrual of items which the taxpayer can't reasonably expect to receive is improper.
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Other possible rules of thumb would be: (1) permit amortization
of issuing discount only (as is done with public securities, later discussed) ; or (2) permit amortization of such an amount of discount
as would, when added to interest received, not exceed an arbitrarily
fixed percentage of the taxpayer's purchase price-say, 8%. Neither
of these would follow accepted accounting practice; neither would take
account of the actual extent to which discount represents interest in
each case; neither would eliminate all present inconsistencies; and either
would result in much bookkeeping and administrative difficulty.' 8
These considerations bolster somewhat the recognized desirability of
uniformity in administrative practices, and the state may well follow
the Federal policies as far as it may legally do so. This can reasonably
be done without expressly approving the validity of all the legal reasoning in the Federal cases. It remains to be seen only whether the uniformity of practice may be complete under our statute.
The state law contains the following provision: "The net income
of a taxpayer shall be computed in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer,
but such method of accounting must be consistent with respect to both
income and deductions, but if in any case such method does not clearly
reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with
such method as in the opinion of the commissioner does dearly reflect
the income, but shall follow as nearly as practicable the Federal practice, unless contrary to the context and intent of this article."' 9 While
this may not cover the precise matter in question, it clearly indicates
20
approval of a general policy of uniformity.
The Revenue Act also prescribes that, in computing gain or loss
upon the disposition of property, cost shall be the basis.21 Denial of
permission to amortize discount obviously does not violate this provision.
The remaining inquiry is whether the fact that "unearned discount"
22
is specified in the state statute as a deduction from gross income,
"8It may be noted, in partial defense of apparent Federal inconsistencies,
that comparable difficulties are not inherent in allowing the issuing corporation
to amortize discount (though there may be other troublesome questions there
encountered). The amount to be amortized is not affected by subsequent market
prices, since the issuing corporation's contract is fixed. A much smaller number
of cases is involved and, on the average, the taxpayer's books are likely to be
more adequate. And in the overwhelming majority of cases, if discount doesn!t
represent interest it represents selling expense, which is likewise recognized to
be "amortizable.
Sec. 318(1), Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.
"0See also Sec. 334, Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939, requiring reports of Federal
assessments and refunds to be made by the taxpayer to the state, thus further
indicating a legislative desire for uniformity.
2 Sec. 319, Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.
22 Sec. 322(3), Ch, 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.
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necessitates the allowdnce of amortization. The argument would be
that unless discount is accruable and thus becomes a part of gross
income, there could be no deduction for unearned discount; and that
it is not to be assumed that a provision is without purpose. The
answer would be that the provision is intended only to insure that discount not earned shall not be taxed; that if, following Federal practice, no part of it goes into gross income prior to realization, then
obviously no part of it can be deducted; and that the provision has its
proper application in connection with bank discount and other cases
in which discount is conceded to be interest.
The difference in total taxes paid by the taxpayer, caused by denying the right to amortize discount, is likely to be much less under the
state law than under the Federal law; and this is said without reference
to the fact that the Federal rates greatly exceed the state rates. Under
either law, over the entire period for which the securities are held, permission to amortize would not change total taxable income of all types,
because any amortization would serve to decrease profit or increase
loss upon sale or redemption. Under either law the total tax paid
would vary to some extent, assuming other income to be constant,
because of the progressive factor in the rates-i.e., taking the entire
discount as income in one year might put the taxpayer in a higher
rate bracket for that year. However, under the Federal law, a further
variation is caused by the fact that the discount is treated as realized
increase in capital value; and, while there would be no difference of
treatment as between interest realized in a particular year and "ordinary" gain realized in the same year, a very material difference results
when the gain, as it ordinarily would in the case of bonds, falls within
23
the statutory definition of "capital gain".
By contrast, except in one respect, there is no such difference of
treatment under the state law. The one limitation for state purposes
is that loss on sale of securities held less than two years may be deducted
only from security gains. 24 In all other situations capital losses are
deductible from ordinary income, of which capital gains are a part. 25
"' The present Federal statute is Int. Rev. Code, §117 (1939). Earlier versions
of the Federal law did not include gain on retirement or redemption of bonds,
as distinguished from gain on sale or exchange, within the definition of capital
gain. However, beginning with the 1934 Revenue Act, any gain from retirement of a bond issued in registered form or with interest coupons is treated as
capital
gain.
"4Sec.
322(6), Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.
"Interpretation of the limitation on security losses presents questions affecting
security transactions regardless of whether discounts or premiums are involved,
the only effect of the latter being to vary the amount of the loss or offsetting gain.
The restrictive provision mentions only sale of stocks or bonds. Would this include loss on redemption or exchange (other than tax-free) of such securities?
On analogy to Federal decisions, it probably would not. See Fairbanks v. United
States, 306 U. S. 436, 59 Sup. Ct. 607, 83 L. ed. 855 (1939). However, if the
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One further difference between state and Federal laws may be noted.
As to bonds purchased at a discount prior to March 1, 1913, market
26
value as of that date would be the Federal basis for gain or loss.
Under the state law the 1913 date has no significance; nor does January
1, 1921, effective date of the state law, have any significance if actual
cost of property acquired prior to that time can be determined.2 7 Failure to give the taxpayer the benefit of any increase in market value
taking place prior to that date raises a question of constitutionality not
within the scope of this article, but it would seem, under existing authority, that it is constitutional.2 8
B., Acquired at a Premium
If a taxpayer subscribes for, or subsequently purchases, a $1,000
corporate bond for $1,050, in what year or years will the $50 premium
enter into the computation of his taxable income?
As clearly indicated by the foregoing discussion and the authorities
there cited, the Federal rule as to bond discount applies also to bond
premium. The subscriber or purchaser is not -permitted to amortize
either, and neither is considered in computing taxable interest. The
taxpayer must wait until disposition of the bond before either discount
or premium enters into the computation of his taxable income. Here
the issuing corporation,
again this differs from the treatment accorded 29
which must amortize any premium it receives.
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Edwards o the taxpayer, a
large insurance company, in seeking permission to amortize premiums
on bonds held by it, argued that amortization was accepted accounting
practice, that it was in harmony with the New York law governing
loss occurred upon final distribution of corporate assets, the limitation would
apply. See the Attorney General's letter of Nov. 22, 1939, to the Commissioner
of Revenue, C. C. H. 1939, N. C. Corp. Tax Serv. 15-099.
"0. D. 475, 2 Cum. Bull. 211 (1920).
"7Sec. 319, Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.
" Norman v. Bradley, 173 Ga. 482, 160 S. E. 413 (1931), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial Federal question, sub noinhine Glenn v. Doyal, 285 U. S.
526, 52 Sup. Ct. 404, 76 L. ed. 923 (1932).
"'Helvering v. Union Pacific Ry., 293 U. S. 282, 55 Sup. Ct. 165, 79 L. ed.
363 (1934). If the bonds were issued prior to March 1, 1913, the premium represents income received prior to that date and is not taxable through amortization.
Old Colony R. R, v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 52 Sup. Ct. 211, 76 L. ed.
484 (1932); U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, §19.22(a)-18. No similar limitation applies

to discounts.

While permitting amortization to the issuing corporation, neither the Court
nor the Board of Tax Appeals has been willing to concede that the premium is so
related to interest that it simply serves to reduce the annual interest deduction of
the debtor. Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, supra; Fall River Electric
Light Co., 23 B. T. A. 168 (1931). Technically, therefore, the inconsistency
existing between the rules applying to the issuing corporation and the rules
applying to the subscriber is one of practical treatment rather than legal theory.
80271 U. S. 109, 46 Sup. Ct. 436, 70 L. ed. 859 (1926).
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insurance companies, that it had been upheld in trust estate cases, and
that the actual interest income could be determined only by reference
to the premiums. However, the Court said: "Unless the addition
amounted to 'a loss actually sustained within the year', no deduction
could be made therefor. Obviously, no actual ascertainable loss had
occurred. All of the securities might have been sold thereafter above
cost. The result of the venture could not be known until they were
either sold or paid off." 3 1 At least one state court has adopted the
32
same viewpoint.
Many of the considerations mentioned in connection with discounts
operate to make it advisable for the state to conform to the Federal
rules. Here again it is conceded that the premium is to be taken
into consideration at some time. If a ten-year bond, $1,000 par, costs
the original subscriber $1,050 and is sold five years later for $1,040,
the result under the Federal rule is a loss in the year of sale of $10.
If amortization were allowed, there would be a reduction of the basis
to $1,025; there would then be a gain in the year.of sale of $15; and
the difference between the total amortization deductions of $25 and the
final gain of $15 would be the same $10 net loss. The only controversy
is over the time element and the character ("ordinary" or "capital") of
loss or gain; and, as already explained, this latter is much less important
under the state law than under the Federal law.
Perhaps practical considerations do not favor the Federal rule as
strongly in the case of premiums as in the case of discounts. In the
main, a premium is paid for a bond or note only if it bears interest
at a rate greater than the rate borne by equally safe securities selling at
par; and this is true as to both original subscription and subsequent
purchase. There are other factors which might influence the price,
such as ability to convert the bonds into other securities at a potentially advantageous value, or the possibility of redemption at a premium
prior to maturity. However, these factors would not ordinarily be
present; and there is certainly no factor ordinarily entering into
premium comparable to collapse of the debtor's responsibility as a
factor entering into discount. In the overwhelming majority of cases,
-premium could be considered as controlled -primarily if not exclusively
by the interest rate on comparable securities, which would logically
lead to permission to amortize except in unusual cases. Nevertheless,
this possibility of greater ease of administration, by comparison with
discounts, would not, standing alone, justify departure from the Federal
rule, particularly when the latter is still more simple to administer.
There is no provision in the state law, comparable to the "unearned
1Id. at 116.
"Van

Dyke v. Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 460, 146 N. W. 812 (1914).
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discount" provision, which raises a question as to the right to deny
permission to amortize premium.
This acquiescence in the Federal practice is advocated solely in
the interest of simplicity of administration and uniformity of practice.
As will subsequently be apparent, the writer does not accept the judicial
viewpoint that premium and interest are so unrelated that premium
cannot ever be considered as establishing the effective interest rate.

II.

BONDS ISSUED BY GOVERNMENTAL UNITS, INTEREST FROM

WHICH IS TAX EXEMPT

A. Acquired at a Discount
Even when it was generally agreed that Federal and state governments could not tax the interest from each other's bonds, it was held
that gain resulting from sale or disposition of such securities was
taxable.13 Consequently, if we take literally the professed reason for
the Federal rule as to private bond discount,34 that discount is fundamentally different from interest, it should follow that, upon disposition
of the security, anything received on account of the discount is taxable.
The weakness of the distinction is indicated by the fact that it has not
been followed in the public security field, where determination of what
constitutes interest has its greatest importance. It has been recognized there that issuing discount, at least, is related to and may be the
equivalent of interest.
The Willcuts case expressly left open the question of whether there
could be taxable gain upon exempt government securities to the extent
that such gain represented only issuing discount. However, Congress
had already provided that, for tax exemption purposes, discount on noninterest bearing Treasury bills should be regarded as interest3 5 More
recently it enacted a similar provision with reference to increment in
" WilIcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. 304 (1931):
Similarly capital gain on Federal bonds is subject to Federal income tax, at least,

unless the statute authorizing the bonds plainly exempts such gains. The exemption of "interest" or of "income" is not enough: Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 401, 14 F. Supp. 541 (1936), cert. denied 300 U. S.
678, 57 Sup. Ct. 668, 81 L. ed. 882 (1937); United States v. Stewart (U. S.
Supreme Court, Nov. 12, 1940); Stern Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 108 F. (2d)
309 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940), aff'd without opinion, U. S. Supreme Court, Nov. 12,
1940.
Not within the scope of this article is the question of whether Congress can,
by statutory language sufficiently plain, exempt capital gains on Federal bonds
from state income taxation. The Willcuts case casts considerable doubt on its
power to do so. The question would have become important if the Stewart case
had construed the exemption provision as including capital gains, so the provision
expressly applied to state as well as Federal taxes.
3
Corn Exchange Bank, 6 B. T. A. 158 (1927).
"Pub. L. No. 11, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (June 17, 1929). See also T. D.
4276, VIII-2 Cune. Bull. 83 (1929).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

value of the non-interest bearing U. S. Saving ("Baby") Bonds. 80
Administrative rulings have extended the same doctrine to non-interest
bearing municipal notes 3" and to interest bearing municipal and state
bonds. 88 These statutes and rulings make it apparent that, in the public
security field, so far as issuing discount is concerned, there is no distinction made between bonds and other types of obligations or between
interest bearing and non-interest bearing obligations.
As far as bonds are concerned, what is the difference between a
discount on a private bond and a discount on a public bond? The
essential question is whether discount is interest; and it is very difficult
to see how this could vary, from either the economic standpoint or the
standpoint of legal theory, dependent upon whether the borrower is a
private corporation or a government.
Is there, then, any justification for the difference in treatment?
If so, it must be found in the fact that in the case of private securities
the discount is clearly taxable, regardless of what it is, and the secondary
problems, as to when and by what method the amount shall be taxed,
are the only actual problems presented. On the other hand, in the case
of public securities, the primary problem, as to whether the discount
is taxable at all, must be settled because of the statutory and (it will
here be assumed) constitutional provisions which entitle "interest" to
exemption. It seems not unreasonable that practical administrative
difficulties, such as those discussed at length above, should be given
great weight in determining questions of time and method, while being
given much less weight, or none at all, in determining a question of
exemption or taxability.
The difference in treatment of issuing discount on public and
private bonds has not received authoritative judicial sanction, presumably because the statutory and administrative rules as to public
" Pub. L. No. 3, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 4, 1935).. See also I. T. 3263,
1939-1 Cum. Bull. 96. These Savings Bonds belong to that class of Federal
securities given only a limited exemption from Federal income taxation. Interest
from principal (aggregate for the class) exceeding $5,000 is subject to surtax.
In applying this provision, it has been ruled that taxpayers on an accrual basis
are to be regarded as receiving interest from the principal amount (which is
issue price) of their Savings Bonds annually, while those on a cash basis are to
ib regarded as receiving it upon redemption. G. C. M. 15875, XIV-2 Cum.
Bull. 100 (1935); I. T. 2958, XV-1 Cum. Bull. 120 (1936). There is no provision of the state law giving rise to a problem of precisely this character.
.TG. C. M. 10452, XI-1 Cum. Bull. 18 (1932); cf. I.
T. 2674, XII-1 Cum.
Bull. 96 (1933), stating that when a city issued non-interest bearing notes for
property, the total amount of the notes exceeding the cash price of the property,
no part of the notes could be treated as exempt interest.
"I. T. 2629, XI-1 Cum. Bull. 20 (1932) ; G. C. M. 21890, 1940-13 Cum. Bull.
2. The first held that when 4% municipal bonds were issued at a discount to
yield 4.5%, the discount represented tax-exempt interest. The second held that
when interest bearing state bonds, issued at a discount, were redeemed at a
premium prior to maturity, the entire discount (though not the premium received)
represented tax-exempt interest.
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bonds are generally favorable to the taxpayer. However, it is difficult
to see how the courts, when presented with the exemption problem,
could fail to recognize the connection between issuing discount and
interest, regardless of troublesome expressions in private bond casesthat is, so long as we still have express statutory, if not constitutional,
exemptions. Certainly in the absence of authoritative pronouncements,
it should not be assumed that the questionable doctrine of the private
bond cases (whatever practical considerations may there favor the result
reached) will be carried over into the public bond cases, where the
questionable character of the doctrine would be more manifest and its
ultimate net results more important. The state should clearly follow
the present Federal practice as to issuing discounts on public securities,
at least where dealing with the original subscriber.
The Federal treatment of discount when public bonds are purchased
after they are outstanding depends upon whether the bonds were originally issued at a discount. The rule, as illustrated by its application
to Treasury bills3 9 and to municipal bonds and notes, both non-interest
bearing 40 and interest bearing,41 is that the issuing discount is apportioned to each successive holder in proportion to the percentage of the
entire life of the security for which he holds it.4 That is, if a tenyear, $1,000 bond originally issued at $950 is purchased by the taxpayer after five years for $975, his market discount represents exactly
his portion of the issuing discount and is non-taxable interest, so that
upon redemption at maturity at par he has no gain or loss. If his
purchase price was $960 he would have, upon redemption, a gain -of
$15 (the difference between his. realized market discount and his portion
of the issuing discount). In the latter case, if he did not hold it until
3 T. D. 4276, VIII-2 Cum. Bull. 83 (1929).
Since market price on these
bills varied little from issuing price plus accrued discount, and the necessary
bookkeeping to compute gain or loss tended to be more complicated than important, Congress subsequently provided that neither gain nor loss should be
recognized in connection with them. Pub. L. No. 376, 71st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(June 17, 1930). See T. D. 4292, IX-2 Cum. Bull. 102 (1930).
'"G. C. M. 10452, XI-1 Cune. Bull. 18 (1932).
4I. T. 2629, XI-1 Cum. Bull. 20 (1932).
"2This rule was not arrived at originally for state and local securities. The
early rulings were summarized in G. C. M. 1455, VI-1 Cum. Bull. 87 (1927).
At first all discount was regarded as distinct from interest, hence taxable. Then it
was conceded that issuing discount represented tax-exempt interest to the taxpayer holding to maturity; but if the subscriber' sold prior to maturity he was
not allowed to treat any part of such discount as interest, the idea being that
he never actually received the discount from the unit itself and that only the
unit itself could pay tax-exempt interest. Further, no discount received by a purchaser other than the original subscriber was, regarded as tax-exempt interest,
even in cases in which there was an issuing discount. G. C. M. 10452, XI-1
Cum. Bull. 18 (1932) re-examined the various rules, compared them with the
treatment accorded Treasury bills, and concluded that discount on other exempt
securities should logically receive the same treatment as that on the bills. None
of the rulings conceded that purchase discount in excess of issuing discount
could be regarded as exempt interest.
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redemption, but sold it after two years for $990, he would have taxable
gain of $20-that is, while the total difference between his purchase
price and his sale price is $30, this is subject to reduction by his portion
of the issuing discount which, for two years, totals $10.48 It will be
seen that the effect of this is to permit amortization of the issuing discount and to treat it as tax-exempt interest, whereas any additional discount received in the subsequent purchase may represent taxable gain.
In no case may total discount treated as tax exempt interest, regardless
of the number of successive holders, exceed issuing discount. It follows that where securities not originally issued at a discount are thereafter purchased at a discount, none of the4 4discount represents taxexempt interest, but all may be taxable gain.
Is this distinction between "issuing" discount and "purchase" discount justifiable? From the standpoint of the taxpayer, logic would
require a negative answer, because clearly in some cases, at least, the
"purchase" discount will represent only the result of increase in current
interest rates since the security was issued. Again, however, this logic
would require administrative authorities to determine in each case
whether it actually represents that or something else such as a material
change in the issuing unit's credit rating, and we are back to situations
in which practical difficulties must be given great weight.
"Correspondingly, according to the Federal rulings, if his sale price in the
last-mentioned case had been $950, he would have a deductible loss of $20
($10 difference between purchase and sale prices plus his $10 portion of issuing
discount). This is an unsound rule which should not be followed by the state.
The taxpayer's portion of issuing discount, if received, would be exempt interest.
Had he accrued it, reported it and paid tax on it, his failure to receive it would
give rise to a deduction; but that has not been done. A deduction for interest
can arise only from a prior taxable accrual, not from the mere failure to receive
anticipated interest. It has properly been held that failure to receive interest,
accrued on the taxpayer's books but tax-exempt, does not give rise to a deduction. District Bond Co. v. Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 9th,
1940). It is difficult to see how discount treated as tax-exempt interest could
stand in any more advantageous position. No actual loss has been suffered, and
since the State law allows only actual losses to be deducted, the state should not
follow this Federal -practice, despite the desirability of uniformity.
A rule of thumb might be that discount on public securities, to the extent
that it represents tax-exempt interest, can operate to reduce or eliminate gain
upon sale of the security; but it can never operate to give a loss deduction
greater than the excess of actual acquisition price over actual disposal price.
(As to whether, in every case, recognizable loss should be as great as such excess
is a problem subsequently discussed.)
The Federal practice apparently rests upon the assumption that, when the
security is disposed of, the price received should first be applied to the seller's
portion of issuing discount; and that this leaves only the balance to be treated
as return of capital. In the writer's view, this is contrary to everyday conceptions as to what takes place. It is much more in accord with those conceptions to treat the price received as first applicable to return of capital
actually invested.
" Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl. 401, 14
F. Supp. 541 (1936), cert. denied 300 U. S.678, 57 Sup. Ct. 668, 81 L. ed. 882
(1937) (Liberty Bonds) ; 0. D. 729, 3 Cum. Bull. 123 (1920) (Treasury certificates of indebtedness).

19401

EFFECT OF DISCOUNT OR PREMIUM

It has already been pointed out that, whatever expressed judicial
theories may be, the actual justification for differentiating between discounts in the private and public bond cases is the necessity of isolating
exempt interest in the latter. We might expect, therefore, that the differentiation would cease when the necessity for it ceases, and that is apparently what has happened. The exemptions, whether statutory or constitutional, extend only to the interest paid by the issuing government.
At its broadest this can include only stated interest plus issuing discounts. By them the unit's contract becomes fixed. Whether the market price of the bonds is more or less than the issuing price, the amount
to be paid by the unit cannot be varied (except by its own purchases of
the securities before maturity or by refunding operations involving
exchanges, which are not controlling considerations). It follows that,
even though the purchaser regards his discount as fixing his effective interest rate (and even though he may be right), if the rate so fixed exceeds the rate payable by the unit the excess would not be exempt
interest. This excess stands in the same position as discount on private
bonds and can be treated in the same way; and this is, in effect, the
result of the Federal rules. Here again, despite logical inconsistencies,
.the state, to secure uniformity, may follow the Federal lead, except to
the extent that to do so would involve giving a loss deduction based on
45
failure to receive anticipated discount.
The writer is not unaware that the near future may bring a great
curtailment of exemption for interest on public securities. The Federal
government is, of course, already taxing interest from many of its
issues; and there would seem to be no doubt of the state's power to tax
interest on future issues floated by it and its subdivisions.
The recent public salary cases 46 may, as many believe, indicate that
the Supreme Court will, when called upon, find that the levy of a
Federal tax on state bond interest, or vice versa, is not such a direct,
substantial or discriminatory burden on the borrowing power as to
violate constitutional principles. And, in the light'of the current phenominal revenue needs, there are not lacking indications that legis47
lation may soon be forthcoming to test the question.
," See note 43, supra.
8 Graves v. People of State of N. Y. ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59

Sup. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed. 927 (1939) ; State Tax Commission of Utah v. Van Cott,

306 U. S. 511, 59 Sup. Ct. 605, 83 L. ed. 950 (1939).
' An amendment providing for taxation' of interest from all future issues of
public securities, offered to the recent Excess Profits Tax Bill by Senator Brown
of Michigan, was defeated by a narrow margin, but there is no assurance that
this result may not soon be reversed, despite the opposition of organized State

officials.
North Carolina has already provided for taxation of Federal interest if and
when Congress attempts to tax state interest. See Sec. 317 (2) (d), Ch. 158, N.
C. Pub. L. 1939.
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Such curtailment of the interest exemption as these developments
may foreshadow would obviously, upon arrival, reduce the importance
of the public security discount problem here discussed; and might well
result in treating public security discount, to the extent of such curtailment, on the same basis as private security discount. It seems unlikely, however, that the exemption will be completely eliminated in the
near future. There is nothing presently indicating that the state legislature contemplates taxation of interest on future issues of the state and
its subdivisions. Further, the state, and probably the Federal government, cannot tax interest on past issues floated under statutes expressly
granting interest exemption. Even if taxation of future interest on past
issues should be permitted, a question would still remain as to issuing
discount on such past issues. To some considerable extent, therefore,
this problem seems likely to remain with us for some time.
B. Acquired at a Premium
As already indicated, a taxpayer, under Federal rules, is not permitted to amortize a premium paid for private securities, whether paid
upon original subscription or later purchase. It thus is treated as
having no relation to interest received, but (at least in cases of acquisition since March 1, 1913) as being part of the cost of the security
which is taken as the basis for determining gain or loss upon disposition. No distinction is made between premium on private securities
and premium on public securities by either the Federal administrative
authorities 48 or the Board of Tax Appeals. 49 However, for this purpose, premium should not be confused with accrued interest. When a
transaction is so handled that accrued interest is a separate part of the
price, that part is not to be considered in determining the purchase
or sale price for gain or loss purposes. 50
Whether the state should follow this part of the Federal practice is
a question currently of considerable importance. Most high grade
public securities of older issues are now selling at substantial premiums.
Further, certain brokerage houses have been advising their clients, in
making bids for new offerings, to make their bids on a basis of a high
interest rate and a premium rather than a low interest rate and par,
the theory being that the net interest received will be the same and the
premium will eventually be deductible for tax purposes by virtue of
being considered part of the purchase price. (What better illustration
could be asked of the extent to which legal thinking has departed from
,'0.D. 726, 3 Cure. Bull. 49 (1920); cf. G. C. M. 1455, VI-1 Cur. Bull.
87 (1927).
' John H. Watson, Jr., 27 B. T. A. 463 (1932); Cornelia W. Roebling, 37

B. T. A. 82 (1938).

o1. T. 2050, 111-2 Cum. Bull. 16 (1924).
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practical finance?) Casual inspection of newspaper stories of county
and city issues recently sold by the state's Local Government Commission does not reveal that, as yet, this advice has materially affected successful bids, but it remains a distinct possibility.51
In the writer's view, the state should not follow the Federal practice as to premium on exempt securities. There are two lines of reasoning which support this view.
(1) Suppose that the taxpayer subscribes for a $1,000, ten-year,
4% bond at $1,050. There is no doubt that, in such a case, the taxpayer pays the $50 premium because he expects to receive the 4%
interest. He anticipates that the premium will be returned to him out
of the interest and the balance of the interest will be his net return
from the investment. That, as a practical matter, in the average case,
this premium is to be interpreted as an adjustment of the interest rate,
rather than as a true capital expenditure is hardly to be doubted. Bond
prices are universally analyzed in terms of "yield" rather than stated
interest rates. Most large security holders recognize the principle by
amortizing the premium on their books. And, from the other side of
the transaction, the successful bid on local government securities in
North Carolina is determined by considering both stated interest rate
and premium. As already seen, the Federal statutes and administrative
authorities have, in the public security field, recognized the connection
between issuing discount and interest. Why no similar recognition has
been given to the connection between issuing premium and interest is
not apparent; but it certainly should be given. If it were given, then the
"cost" which is the basis for gain or loss would be considered as embracing only true capital investment, or par, and the premiuin would
be eliminated in determining gain or loss, at least where the subscriber
holds the security until maturity. Or, if it be insisted that "cost" basis
must be construed to include the entire sum paid out, then so much of
it as represents premium may be regarded as recovered by the taxpayer
through his receipt of interest. There is no sound reason why the subscriber should be allowed to treat an issuing discount as tax-exempt
5 County and city
bonds and notes, which must be sold through the Local
Government Commission, can be sold to the bidder whose bid will result in the
lowest interest cost to the unit. N. C. CoDF ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§2492(15),
2492(16).

The lowest interest cost is determined by deducting premium bid from

the total interest requirements over the life of the security. Thus, on a one-year
note for $1,000, a bid of 501a interest with a $40 premium would take precedence
over a bid of 2% interest at par.
What the practice may be in other states is immaterial, as the interest from
the securities of other states and their subdivisions is taxed by North Carolina,
and such securities can be treated in the same manner as private securities.
Throughout the article "public securities" is used, so far as it affects the state
income tax, to include only securities of the Federal government, North Carolina, its subdivisions, and such of their agencies and instrumentalities as fall
within the exempt class.
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interest and also treat issuing premium as purely capital investment,
completely disassociated from interest, which lays the basis for inevitable future loss.
If this line of reasoning is followed, the amount of the premium
might still be of importance if the subscriber sells the security before
maturity. If he subscribes $1,050 for a $1,000 ten-year bond, at the
end of five years he has received half the interest and has then been
refunded half of his $50 premium. If he sells the bond for $1,010, he
has a deductible loss of $15-that is, the difference between his remaining "investment" of $1,025 and his sale price. In other words, the
premium is amortized.
Suppose a ten-year, $1,000 bond is issued at par and the taxpayer
buys it after five years for $1,050. Upon redemption at maturity at
par, does he have a deductible loss? The answer should be in the
negative. In discussing discounts it will be found that the only distinction made between public and private bonds was as to issuing discounts;
but there is no reason why this limitation should affect premiums. As
to discounts, it was pointed out that purchase discount, while concededly it might well be related to the interest received by the taxpayer,
had no relation to exempt interest since that was fixed by the issuing
unit's contract. On the other hand, when dealing with premium, our
question is not what part of the return from a given transaction represents tax exempt interest, but whether a part of the taxpayer's capital
investment has actually been lost.
In the case put, the purchaser sees fit to buy a $1,000 bond, having
five years yet to run, for $1,050. So far as he is concerned there is no
difference between this and subscribing originally for a $1,000, fiveyear bond at $1,050. He would treat the two transactions in the same
manner on his books; he will analyze them equally in terms of yield;
and, if he holds to maturity, he will in each case receive exactly what
he anticipated. We conclude, therefore, that should this first, or
"amortization," theory be adopted, it would apply both to issuing and to
purchase premiums. The tax liability of the purchaser paying a premium would be uninfluenced by whether the bond was originally issued
at par, at a premium, or at a discount. The actual premium he pays
and the remaining life of the bond are the governing factors.
It must necessarily be conceded that, in so far as this treats premium
as directly related to interest it is plainly contrary to the reasoning of
the Federal cases. As already pointed out, even when allowing the
issuing corporation to amortize premium, it has not been recognized
'5 2
that premium is to be regarded as reducing the "effective interest rate."
2See note 29, .rpra. In Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, there cited, the
Court seemed, in fact, slightly annoyed that the accountants had thought up such
an outlandish doctrine as that of "effective interest rate."
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However, in the writer's view, for the reasons already indicated: (a)
this reasoning is erroneous because not grounded on legitimate business practice; (b) even if premium has nothing to do with interest, the
fact remains that the subscriber or purchaser, when he receives exactly
what he contracts for, should not be considered as suffering a loss.
The North Carolina statute allows as deductions only losses "actually
sustained". 53 If the writer's view is correct, to allow deduction of
premium as a loss, when the taxpayer receives his interest and then
receives the par value of his bond, would be a clear violation of this
provision; and, despite the reasoning of the Federal cases and the
general policy favoring uniformity, the Federal rule should not be followed unless constitutional considerations would compel the state to
do so. Possible constitutional objections are discussed below in connection with a broader, alternative theory. It need be said here only
that there is no sound reason why they should operate to prevent the
state from proceeding under this first theory.
The justification for thus differentiating between premium on
public securities and premium on private securities is to be found in
the fact that, in the case of private securities, the annual interest is
taxed. Since this is discussed at some length below, there is no need
to elaborate it here.
If this theory were adopted, a taxpayer subscribing for or purchasing
a public bond at a premium would never have a loss unless he disposed
of it for less than par plus unamortized premium.54
(2) The second, and broader, theory is that the holder of a public
bond can never have an actual loss unless his total receipts from it
amount to less than he paid for it.
If the taxpayer pays $1,050 for a $1,000, ten-year, 4% bond and
holds it to maturity, he has received back $1,000 in principal and $400
in interest, or a total of $1,400. Clearly the result of his transaction
is a net profit, of some kind, of $350. Neither he nor anybody else
could conceive of the transaction as actually representing a loss.
It must be admitted that this theory, if adopted, would lead much
" Sec. 322(6), Ch. 158, N. C. Pub. L. 1939.

"A difficult problem might be presented under this theory if the taxpayer
actually receives less than the stipulated interest. Suppose he subscribes $1,050
for a $1,000, ten-year, 4% bond, receives his 4% interest for the first five years,
and then agrees to take 3%o interest for the remaining five. Has he a loss and,
if so, how much? If he does have a loss, it could hardly be more than a proportionate part of the premium. That is, for the first five years his annual
amortization of premium would still be $5, while for the last five it would
be at least three-fourths of $5, or $3.75. His loss would not exceed the balance
of $1.25 per year for the last five years, a total of $625. It would be preferable,.
however, so long as interest received each year totals an amount sufficient to,
offset the $5 amortization charge, to regard it as applicable'to that purpose. This.
would mean, of course, that in the case put there would be no deductible loss.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

further than mere disallowance of premiums as losses. It would mean
adoption of a general rule that there could be no loss unless total
principal and interest receipts were less than the purchase price, whether
the latter be par or included a premium or discount. Suppose a $1,000,
4% bond is purchased at par and held for six years and then sold for
$800. We have undoubtedly been accustomed to thinking of this as
representing a loss of $200; yet actually the taxpayer has received a total
of $1,040 for his $1,000 investment. Where is his loss? There could
be none from the entire transaction unless the sale price fell below
$760. There is no reason, other than the conventional modes of thought
about "capital loss", for permitting a loss deduction in such a case.
Of course, when total receipts exceed payments it does not follow
that there is taxable gain or profit; it follows only that there is gain
and, therefore, there can be no loss. To determine what is taxable gain
requires segregation of exempt interest-a segregation entirely unnecessary for loss purposes.
Does this suggestion involve an unjustifiable failure to take account
of the fact that in the case last put the taxpayer has not received what
he expected to receive and, therefore, has suffered a loss? No more than
the commonly accepted fact that, if he is forced to accept 3% interest
instead of a stipulated 4% he has suffered no tax loss (unless he has
already accrued the 4% and reported it for taxation).
Does the theory involve an unwarranted failure to differentiate
between "capital" and "interest" or "income"? That is, in computing
the allowable loss from sale of securities, must we credit against the
original capital investment only such amounts received as are conventionally recognized as return of capital, and not those which, like annual
interest payments, are ordinarily regarded by the recipient as something which he can spend immediately and still leave his capital intact?
But, assuming that capital and income are capable of precise and mutually exclusive definition, and disregarding the fact that income after
receipt can and does become capital, is there any reason why the distinction should have importance in the present situation? No attempt
is being made to tax as income something which should be regarded as
capital. No attempt is being made to tax anything connected with the
transaction. The only question is whether the transaction involves a
loss which *can be used to offset other income; and there is no reason
why capital and income should be distinguished for this purpose. Before there can be a particular kind of loss it should be determined that
there is an actual loss. It may be conceded that if, under the formula
here advocated, there is a loss, it would be a loss of capital; but it need
not be conceded that a loss of capital in excess of actual loss should
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be -permitted. (However, the writer admits to some suspicion that, in
most courts, the theory might founder upon this point.)
The next question is whether the theory would not apply with
equal validity to private- security transactions. It would; but there
may be justification for difference in method of treatment if the final
result is not essentially different. Take the case of a corporate $1,000
4% bond purchased at par, held ten years and sold for $900. In thelast year we allow a loss of $100. During the holding period, however, the taxpayer has received $400 in taxable interest. Since he has
paid out $1,000 and has received back only $400 plus $900 or $1,300,
we know that the entire transaction can represent only $300 profit.
We have taxed him alread

on $400. 5 5

We tax him on interest annu-

ally because it is more convenient to do so and because it is conventionally considered "income" received within the year; but if we do not
then allow the $100 loss we have taxed him on more than his actual
profit on the entire transaction. This factor is definitely not present
in the public security cases, because there nothing has been taxed. At
the end of the transaction nothing will be taxed, because any net profit
in the case put necessarily represents exempt interest; but neither is
there any loss.
Suppose momentarily that interest on private securities were not
taxed annually, but taxable profit or loss for each transaction were computed at its close. In the above illustration, we would arrive at a taxable profit for the final year of $300-the net result for all years under
the present system. If the sale price had been $500, we would arrive
at a net loss for the final year of $100, also the net result of the present
system under which we would tax a total of $400 and allow a loss of
$500. The net result of the two methods would always be the same
in the case of private securities. If we could apply either to public
securities, the results would likewise be the same; but there annual
taxation of interest is prevented by the exemption granted, and the
exemption likewise prevents taxation in the final year wherever the net
profit does not exceed the amount properly regarded as interest.
In other words, while the suggestion could be applied to private
security transactions, it would be unreasonable to do so unless we
abandoned the annual taxation of interest from such securities. The
absence of this factor in the public security field justifies the suggested
difference in treatment. The difference between the two situations seems
" Concededly, because of personal exemptions or lack of other income, we
may have actually collected tax on nothing at all. However, the personal situation of the taxpayer and variations in other income from year to year should not
be allowed to confuse the problem. It should be resolved on the basis of the
tax status of types of income or deductions, assuming that in each year involved
the taxpayer has some taxable income.
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just as substantial as that which has led to the difference in treatment
of discounts as between public and private bonds. 56
Assuming that the state authorities wished to adopt this proposal,
would it be constitutional and, if so, could it be done under the present
statute ?
The various constitutional arguments which might be made, are
very similar in character. As to Federal securities, the argument would
be that it amounts to indirect taxation of exempt interest; that it discriminates against such securities; and that, even if no indirect taxation of interest or discrimination is involved, it is itself a direct burden
on the borrowing power. As to state and local securities, the first
two arguments might also be used (the first on the theory that to permit
taxation of interest in such a way will violate the prohibition against
impairment of contracts). None of the arguments seems valid.
It would not amount to indirect taxation of interest. The whole
purpose of the rule is to determine how much, if any, other income
can be offset, not how much of the total receipts from the transaction
are taxable. It is conceded that if total receipts exceed the price paid,
no part of such excess which represents interest can be taxed. The
argument is really that there is indirect taxation of interest solely because the same deductions are not allowed as in the case of private
securities. Thus it really amounts to the same idea as the discrimination argument.
Yet, while obviously there is a difference in the method of treatment,
there is no legal discrimination. Wherever there is a reasonable factual
difference the legal basis is laid for difference in method of treatment.
There is such a factual difference here in that interest from private
securities is taxed annually while that from public securities is not.
When Congress provided that the taxpayer could not deduct interest paid
on money borrowed to purchase tax exempt securities, it was likewise
argued that the provision was discriminatory. However, the Supreme
Court decided otherwise. 57 Further, it has been held that accrued taxexempt interest cannot subsequently be charged off against other income as a bad debt.58
"It might be argued that, if this theory is sound, it should also be applied
to determine deductibility of losses on those corporate stocks the dividends from
which are not taxable to the stockholder. See §§311 and 322(5), Ch. 158, N. C.
Pub. L. 1939. However, this does not necessarily follow. Interest on public
securities is exempt though it represents income which has never been taxed
to any taxpayer. Corporate dividends are exempt to the stockholder only because
the legislature regards them as representing income already taxed to the corporation. Since the dividend income has thus already been taxed, the stock
stands
in the position of private rather than public bonds.
T

" Denman v. Slayton, 282 U. S. 514, 51 Sup. Ct. 269, 75 L. ed. 500 (1931).
"8District Bond Co. v. Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940).
Cf. the language of Mr. Justice Stone, dissenting, in National Life Ins. Co. v.
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Finally, the result of the suggestion would not be to place a direct
burden on the borrowing power (assuming that taxation of interest will
continue to be judicially regarded as being ;n unconstitutional burden
on such power). Possibly, if the suggestion were adopted for all state
and Federal income taxes, it might have some very slight influence on
the interest rates and saleability of government securities, though such
influence would be trivial by comparison to such matters as the safety
of the investment and the exemption of the interest. However,. as long
as there is no attempt by a state to tax anything connected with the
borrowing transaction, there can be no direct burden, in the legal sense,
on the borrowing power. Refusal to permit reduction of other taxable
income, having nothing to do with public securities, should hardly be
regarded as such a burden.
The conclusion is that there is nothing unconstitutional about the
suggestion. Thus, if our statute expressly incorporated it, there would
be no further question to be considered. Even if the suggestion be
regarded as manifesting a regrettable failure to comprehend the simple
distinction between income and capital, this could hardly render unconstitutional a statute which adopted it. The legislature must be conceded considerable discretion in refusing to allow deductions, even
though they involve loss of capital; and this is particularly true where
the loss grows out of a transaction which is, in part, tax-exempt.
However, since there is no express provision incorporating the suggestion in our statute, could it be followed by administrative authorities
under the law as written? As already indicated, the only losses permitted as deductions by our statute are losses actually sustained in connection with a transaction entered into for profit. There is no reason
why this should not be construed to mean what it says; and, if the above
analysis is sound, there has been no actual loss. In determining gain
or loss, the basis is cost (unless the security was acquired prior to
January 1, 1921, and cost is not determinable). This requirement is
completely satisfied, as the entire purchase price is considered in determining whether there was a loss.
Several accountants with whom the writer has talked have attacked
the suggestion on the ground that, by taking account of interest payments over a period of years, it violates the statutory plan of breaking"
up the taxpayer's affairs into annual periods, each of which must be
considered alone for tax purposes. This, however, seems to be an
United States, 277 U. S. 508, 536, 48 Sup. Ct. 591, 599, 72 L. ed. 968, 978 (1928) :
"There is a distinction between imposing a burden and withholding a favor. By
the Constitution or by contract the holders of tax-exempt securities are protected from burdens; but from neither source do they derive an affirmative claim
to favors."
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unsound objection. Obviously, for determination of gain or loss upon
disposition of property the events of past years must always be considered. The annual period has importance only in determining when
gain or loss is to be reported, not in determining the exact amount of
gain or loss.
The writer is fully aware that his conclusions with regard to these
theories are merely his own and that there is no assurance that either
theory would receive judicial approval, particularly in view of Federal
precedent. Because it is less drastic and interferes to a lesser extent
with conventional notions about loss of. capital as an item having nothing to do with annual "income", the chance for judicial approval, in
the absence of express statutory provision, of the first or "amortization" theory would be very much greater than for approval of the
second theory. In fact, administrative authorities might not be willing
to attempt to follow where the latter would lead. They should, however, at least be willing to go as far as adoption of the first proposal.
It remains only to recognize that, to the extent that impending
developments may result in eliminating exemptions for interest on public securities, the importance of the loss problem here discussed will be
lessened, for to that extent those securities may be treated in the same
way as private securities. However, as indicated in connection with
the discussion of discounts, there is no reason to anticipate complete
elimination of the problem in the immediate future.

